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The Crisis of Late Structuralism
Perspectivism and Animism: Rethinking
Culture, Nature, Spirit, and Bodiliness
TERENCE TURNER
Cornell University
tst3@cornell.edu

THE PASSING OF LÉVI-STRAUSS
The death of Claude Lévi-Strauss in November 2009 was an event
that called for due commemoration of a brilliant anthropological career.
It was also an occasion that called upon his epigones and critics among
Amazonian anthropologists, as well as the many thinkers from other lines
of intellectual and cultural work who were inspired and influenced by
his ideas, to contemplate the nature of his contribution and the extent
to which it remains a vital force which continues to influence theoretical
work in the social and cultural disciplines.
The excitement stimulated by the earlier works of Lévi-Strauss
derived from three original theoretical contributions. Firstly, the new
theoretical and methodological approach represented by his synthetic
concept of “structure”, fully presented for the first time in The Elementary
Structures of Kinship (1949), combined the mathematical idea of a group
of transformations constrained by one or more invariant principles (not
previously applied in anthropology, although used at least a century
earlier in economics by Marx among others), the semiotic notions of
classification developed by Saussure in his concepts of the sign and the
field of signification, the componential phonology of the Prague School
linguists Troubetzkoy and Jakobson, psychological associationism, gestalt
ideas of pattern perception, and anthropological notions of comparative
typologies of kinship systems and cultural systems of categories. It was a
bold and creative synthesis drawn from disparate sources, many of which
were unfamiliar to the anthropologists of the day.
Secondly, Lévi-Strauss offered a powerful new idea of the ultimate
object of anthropological analysis, the “fundamental structures of the
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human mind,” which he conceived as the invariant constraints governing
the groups of transformations comprising his structural models, rendered
accessible by the methodological application of his new concept of structure.
These were invariably conceived as psychological or social psychological
principles like reciprocity or the distinction between nature and culture.
They constituted sign posts on the way to Lévi-Strauss’s ultimate goal of
reducing culture to psychology and psychology to the natural processes
of perception and unconscious association that produce the categories of
cognition and classification. The end of this analytical trajectory as LéviStrauss conceived it was the revelation of nature as both the ultimate
transcendental subject and the source of the cognitive features of objective
reality. These ideas comprised Lévi-Strauss’s idea of anthropology’s way of
answering the big question that was its reason for being, to wit “what is
the nature of humanity”? He was perhaps the last major anthropologist to
make the quest for an answer to that question the focus of his career.
Thirdly, Lévi-Strauss can be said to have discovered a new subject matter
for anthropological analysis: the apparently arbitrary and meaningless
details of indigenous myths, cosmologies and systems of knowledge, which
he recognized could be analyzed as the code of logical oppositions and
identities that constituted the cognitive structures of culture.
The three-fold analytical program based on these three fundamental
theoretical innovations exercised great influence on anthropology and
related fields, even among many who remained skeptical of Lévi-Strauss’s
own analytical practice and his ultimate theoretical goals. It took time for
critical thinkers to digest the ideas and clarify their problematic aspects
both in theory and in application. Among the many criticisms that have
been leveled at the structuralist edifice, three stand out for their relevance to
this paper. Firstly, there is a fundamental flaw in Lévi-Strauss’s application
of his theoretical model of structure, which can be summed up as applying
the right model to the wrong level of the data. Lévi-Strauss followed the
conventional conceptions of contemporary semiotics and kinship studies in
conceiving the formal organization of individual kinship systems or myths
as synchronic tableaux of relations or feature contrasts, leaving no room for
internal transformations such as those of mythical plots or developmental
cycles of families. He was therefore obliged to try to apply his structural
model of groups of transformations bounded by invariant constraints to
sets of multiple myths or kinship systems, each considered as a unitary
“transform” or “variant” of a master structure (embodied by the invariant
principle or principles that supposedly comprise the boundary condition
of the group) that cannot be located or defined within any member of
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the group—nor, as it has turned out, anywhere else. Neither Lévi-Strauss
nor any other avowed structuralist has ever succeeded, to my knowledge,
in producing a single analysis of the structure of any “group” of “variants”
of any cultural construct or kinship system that actually meets the formal
requirements of “invariance” specified by Levi-Strauss. This does not mean
that the model itself is unviable or inapplicable, only that it has not been
applied where it should have been, to wit the internal transformations
comprising the developmental processes or plots of the individual systems
in question (kinship systems or mythical narratives), which do form
“groups” of transformations constrained to remain within invariant limits
by the overriding requirement of reproducing the system of relations or
schematic pattern of symbolic actions in question. If this were done first,
the results of these analyses might then be compared at a second level as
a “group” of analogous cases, but what one would be comparing would be
quite different from the synchronic “variants” that comprise structuralist
analyses. A fatal consequence of the synchronizing of the internal patterns of
relations comprising the “variants” or “transforms” of structuralist analyses
is the flattening of their constituent elements into inert, disarticulated
relational or sign-elements deprived of many of the intentional and
dynamic (transformative) meanings they have in their original systemic
context. This is a point with equal relevance to structuralism and some of
its more recent offspring.
The other two main points of Lévi-Strauss’s original structuralist
synthesis are also adversely affected by the unviability of his approach
to structural analysis. His inability to apply his structural model to the
structure of individual systems or “transforms” meant that he was never
able to define invariant constraints coordinating any “group” of transforms
as “fundamental structures” with the precision demanded by his grouptheoretic definition of structure. His characterization of his procedure for
analyzing “groups” of myths in the “overture” to The Raw and the Cooked
(1969) as analogous to a growing crystal which is clearly structured at its
center but fuzzy and ill-defined at its periphery metaphorically evokes his
failure to find the structure of any such group—which means, given his
definition of structure as the invariant law of the group, his failure to find
the structure of any myth. The massive outpouring of unstructured analyses
of mythical patterns and transformations comprising the four volumes of
the Mythologiques, stimulating as they are, represent by Lévi-Strauss’s own
theoretical standards the failure of his structuralist quest for fundamental
structures (Lévi-Strauss 1964:9-40).1
When he moved on from kinship structures to myth and systems of
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knowledge as his principal subjects, Lévi-Strauss’s attempts to translate
the significata of the semiotic elements of myths and cosmological systems
were likewise hobbled by his inability to recognize the significance of the
fact that such individual elements are regularly transformed in the course
of the myth or social process in question—transformations that apply to
their signification as well as to features of their form or relations with other
elements. In the Gê and Bororo myths of the origin of cooking fire that
constitute the initial subject of The Raw and the Cooked, for example, the
fire makes its first appearance as the distant sun in the sky, which men use
to warm meat that they must cut into small pieces and set out on rocks to
catch its rays, then descends to earth as the burning end of a log in the
house of the jaguars, who use it to roast big pieces of meat, and finally
ends up being carried by men to their village, where it is broken up and
used to light other cooking fires (Lévi-Strauss 1964:43-86). Each of these
transformations of the fire carries a different signification, and this series
of transformations conveys a cumulative meaning that is the point of the
myth. Lévi-Strauss analyzes the fire only as the sign of the operation of
cooking, a function it exercised in the pre-cultural house of the jaguars,
missing completely the significance of its use at the end of the myth as
a general means of making other fires, the essential step to full human
culture.
In approaching a critique of the development of structuralism or the
ideas of its more recent theoretical epigones, it is essential to bear in mind
that none of them have developed as purely academic anthropological
projects. Rather, they and their authors have all to varying degrees led double
lives as public intellectuals, engaged in supra-academic controversies of
their times. Since its beginnings shortly after World War II, structuralism
was framed by its advocates as much as a critique of Modern Western
philosophical and social thought, in particular existentialism, Marxism,
hermeneutics, and structural-functional social anthropology, as an
anthropological approach concerned with the kinship systems and myths
of indigenous Australian and Amerindian cultures. The brilliant career of
Lévi-Strauss exemplifies this double focus of the structuralist project, with
its combination of anthropological interest in the more remote and exotic
cultures of aboriginal Australia and the Amazon and its borrowings from
currently modish scientific theories of structural linguistics and semiology,
Merleau-Ponty’s work on the psychology of perception, and what LéviStrauss called the new “mathematics of Man”, the “qualitative math” of
set theory, cybernetics and information technology that became popular
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following World War II (Lévi-Strauss 1955).
The success of structuralism as an intellectual movement owed much
to this double focus, with its seductive methodological implications that
the “fundamental structures” of human mental operations, manifested in
their purest and simplest forms in the cultural productions of the most
“primitive” (i.e., by implication, the most “natural”) human cultures, bear a
family resemblance to the new methods of structural analysis in linguistics
and group theory, thus lending their scientific cachet to structuralist
anthropology. This complex intellectual heritage helps to understand
one of the more problematic aspects of structuralism and its more recent
offshoots from an anthropological perspective, namely its tendency to
reify general conceptual categories such as “nature” and “culture” and to
treat them on the same footing as ethnographic evidence for indigenous
ideas about what can be defined in terms of these categories as “natural”
or “cultural” phenomena. One consequence of this is a tendency to treat
entities or relations that can be attributed to one category or the other as
internally homogeneous, rather than as complex amalgams of both. This
tendency is accentuated by a theoretical reliance on Saussurean semiology,
in particular its concepts of the sign, the field of signification, and the
distinction of langue and parole as models for cultural classifications and
cosmologies, which push analyses in an idealist direction towards the
abstraction of epistemological and classificatory categories from forms of
material activity and social relations.
As an anthropologist working with Gê-speaking people of Central
Brazil, who have played a central role in the formation of Lévi-Strauss’s
ideas about Amazonian social structure and mythology, I have inevitably
found myself carrying on my ethnographic and theoretical work in a
personal and conceptual dialogue with Lévi-Strauss: conceptual, because
his writings pointed me toward problems and ideas that became central
to my own work; and personal, because like many fellow Amazonianists I
found him to be a lively and interested interlocutor, invariably receptive and
generous with his time when I would call on him when in Paris. I began
my work with the Kayapo in 1962, when the influence of Lévi-Strauss was
at its height, and “structuralism” had become a focus of intense interest and
controversy, not only in France but increasingly in Anglophone, Hispanic
and Lusophone anthropological and cultural circles. Since the end of the
‘60s, I have witnessed (and to a small degree participated in) the decline of
its intellectual eminence, which was hastened, if not caused, by the events
of May 1968 in Paris.
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MAY 1968 AS ANTI-STRUCTURALIST REVOLT
The waning of the influence of structuralism as a theoretical approach
within anthropology, as well as in literary and cultural studies more
generally, that began after 1968 was gradual and never total. While LéviStrauss continued to teach and produce published works at an amazing
rate, he nevertheless became an increasingly isolated figure without direct
intellectual heirs. Structuralism, however, has enjoyed a prolonged half-life
in various ostensibly “post-structuralist” and “deconstructionist” recensions,
which have continued some of structuralism’s most fundamental tenets in
different terms. Chief among these was Lévi-Strauss’s failure to produce
“structural” analyses which satisfied his own criteria for structure, thus
making him, in effect, a pioneer of post-structuralism avant l’heure.
The students and workers of May ‘68 did not adorn their barricades
with banners calling for the defense of langue, but with the demand to
prendre la parole. They had not sought to defend existing structures but
to deconstruct them. They were not concerned with the contemplation of
objectified patterns of unconscious thought but with subjective action that
might change and create new forms of consciousness as well as materially
transform existing social relations. Parisian philosophers reacted to what
they perceived as the 1968 crisis of structuralism as a perspective founded
upon a contemplative, Saussurean notion of structure by repudiating
the aspects of Lévi-Strauss’s thought that appeared most out of keeping
with the new ideological climate, which had been germinating in the
universities, factories and other social contexts before it burst into the open
in the demonstrations of May ‘68.
That the epigones of the structuralist hegemony managed to conserve
key aspects of Lévi-Strauss’s theoretical synthesis and to recycle them
as components of the new ostensibly anti-structuralist positions they
developed is an impressive tribute to the hold that structuralism had
acquired over the French cultural imagination. An even more telling
tribute is how many, in their haste to redefine themselves as poststructuralists, energetically asserted, against the evidence of their own
previous writings, that of course they had never been structuralists. The
post-1968 succession of hybrid theoretical formations that followed did
not so much overtly confront and overcome the theoretical and analytical
problems of structuralism as readapt them in new forms that would appear
to make virtues of its theoretical vices. It is this post-1968 succession of
hybrid theoretical formations, juxtaposed with the continued outpouring
of new but theoretically repetitious work by Lévi-Strauss himself, that I
refer to as the crisis of Late Structuralism.
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The most notable among the hybrid positions to emerge in the
immediate aftermath of the events of 1968 came from philosophers
and public intellectuals rather than from anthropologists. They included
Derrida’s heterodox interpretation of Saussure’s theory of the sign, which
Lévi-Strauss had employed as the basis of his concept of structures of signelements, as the basis of decentered anti-structures (Derrida 1967). Derrida
managed this by reinterpreting Saussure’s notion of the arbitrariness of
the signifier-signified relation as an existential gulf of “différance” of the
supposed original unity of signifier and signified. The original model for
Derrida’s notion of déférence may be sought in Lévi-Strauss’s notion of the
incest tabu as a requirement that men should give away their consanguineal
female relations as sexual partners in reciprocal affinal exchanges with
other men, thus deferring the primal unity of familial relations, rather than
follow their supposed natural preference to retain them in incestuous (presocial) unity.
A different tack was taken by Foucault’s inversion of Lévi-Strauss’s use
of Saussure’s concept of langue as the model of his conception of structure
(which Foucault himself had employed in his pre-1968 structuralist period.
In a clear break with Lévi-Strauss, Foucault offered a transvaluation of
Saussure’s fundamental distinction of langue and parole which artfully
co-opted the rhetoric of the movement of 1968, substituting for langue
as the foundational category of his “post-structuralist” system the
complementary Saussurean category of parole, reworked and rebaptized as
discours (Foucault 1968). His conception of discourse, however, departed
from Saussure’s concept of parole in its denial of any role for the subject
as speaker. Instead, he continued to conceive it in the approved austere
Lévi-Straussian fashion as subjectless, like langue, in effect as a kind of
activated form of langue, now understood as a structuring demiurge of
“power”, imposing subjective identities on social persons to enable them to
serve the needs of power, which turn out to be the requirements of social
structure. Althusser produced an analogous theory of the subject as an
“interpellation” of society as a corollary of his “structuralist Marxist” theory
of ideology (Althusser 1971).
These avowedly anti- or post-Lévi-Straussian theoretical positions
were actually formulated as continuations of essential aspects of the
theoretical framework of Lévi-Straussian structuralism by other means,
above all the concept of the subject as an epiphenomenon of impersonal,
unconscious linguistic or ideological structures, and the consequent
irrelevance or illusoriness of subjective consciousness, agency and material
activity.
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THE CRISIS OF LATE STRUCTURALISM:
ANIMISM AND PERSPECTIVISM AS SUCCESSORS
Anthropologists were also influenced by the social and ideological
upheaval of the late 1960s and the new emphases on social action and
subjective agency that followed from them, but they also responded to
distinct influences arising from their discipline’s concerns with the
interaction of human subjects with the natural environment and the social
meanings and cultural treatments of the human body. All of these concerns
informed the reactions within the discipline to the twin crises of LéviStraussian structuralism: the failure of his own project of structural analysis
to reveal the structures he sought, and the rejection of structuralism as a
quietist theoretical dead-end incapable of dealing with the realities of the
contemporary social and cultural inequities of French society, in particular
its class structure and educational system, but also, in the cases we shall
consider here, to the post-structuralist and deconstructionist reactions of
Foucault, Derrida and others.
Among anthropologists deeply engaged with, and influenced by,
Lévi-Strauss’s theoretical framework, the two most important critical
tendencies that have emerged have been the revival of theoretical and
ethnographic work on Animism by Descola, Bird-David and others (BirdDavid 1999; Descola 1994, 1996, 2005, 2009), and the development of
Perspectivism as an approach to indigenous Amazonian, and more broadly,
Amerindian cosmological notions by Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, his
students and associates (Viveiros de Castro 1998, 2002a, 2002b, 2002c,
2004). In both cases, the theorists who initially developed these positions
either began as Lévi-Straussian structuralists (the case of Viveiros de
Castro, a Francophone Brazilian closely involved with Lévi-Strauss and
French anthropology) or as in the case of Descola (a student of Godelier
with ecological and Marxist leanings) formulated their ideas in a critical
dialogue with his vision. Both of these approaches began by challenging
Lévi-Strauss’s central conception of the relation of nature and culture, and
of its role as the frame of his vision of anthropology as “entropology”, the
reduction of culture to the status of an epiphenomenon of nature. LéviStrauss conceived the reduction of culture to nature as operating through
the medium of the determination of subjective consciousness by an
objective “Kantian” unconscious constituted by the neurological apparatus
of perception and the Gestalt-like patterns of association it transmitted to
the conscious mind.
Perspectivism proceeded by turning Lévi-Strauss’s reductionist
proposition inside out through an equally radical but opposite reduction
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of nature to culture, achieved through the elevation of subjective
perspective over objective associationism as the determining constituent
of the “spiritual” identities of all creatures, animals and humans alike.
The foundational claim of perspectivism is that indigenous Amazonians
believe that animals, as the archetypal “natural” creatures, subjectively
identify themselves as humans, the archetypal cultural beings. Animism
arrived at an analogous claim for the universality of the spiritual identity,
presumed to be essentially human and thus cultural, of humans and all
natural entities (including animals, plants and some inanimate beings such
as celestial bodies) by way of Descola’s ethnographic documentation of
the social relations between human and non-human beings among the
Achuar, resulting in a pragmatic blurring of the boundary between the
natural and cultural domains through a spiritual and material infiltration
of each domain by beings from the other category.
Both animism and perspectivism thus take as their point of departure a
reconception of the relation of nature and culture through an exploration of
indigenous conceptions of the common subjectivity of cultural and natural
beings, while diverging on a series of philosophical and theoretical points.
Both tendencies have moved away from basic aspects of Lévi-Strauss’s
thought, as well as from each other, but both have continued in different
ways to work within the framework of Lévi-Strauss’s master concept of
the categorical opposition of nature and culture as the basic concern of
Amazonian, and more broadly Amerindian cosmologies, despite their
otherwise heterodox reformulations of its terms. Both sides have presented
their positions in rhetorically provocative articles clearly intended to invite
critical engagement. I offer the following remarks in the spirit of a collegial
response to this invitation, from the perspective (sic) of yet another former
fellow traveler of the structuralist project.
NATURE AND CULTURE:
THE WOLVERINE AND THE PANSY
The attraction of structuralism for both anthropologists and humanist
intellectuals in its earlier years seemed only to be intensified by its rejection of
foundational concepts and concerns of conventional philosophical, textual
and anthropological analysis—e.g. consciousness, meaning, production,
history, form (as distinct from “structure”), the subject (including
perspective, intentionality, agency, Freudian psychodynamics and affect),
and all aspects of language falling within the Saussurean category of speech
or discourse, from syntax, deixis, object reference, and discourse forms such
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as narrative, to the social pragmatics of speech in context), to select a few
headings from a longer list. Another factor contributing to the curious
prestige of structuralist analyses was their preoccupation with the exotic
and apparently arbitrary and unmotivated details of indigenous myths,
rituals and cosmologies involving unfamiliar animals, plants and natural
forms, which it was the great achievement of Lévi-Strauss to bring within
the purview of a theoretical vision able to recognize their significance.
Lévi-Strauss’s concern with these particulars was integral to his
conception of the great theme of the Amerindian myths, as well as that of
structuralist anthropology: the relation of nature and culture. Lévi-Strauss
conceived of this relation on two levels. On the one hand, he interpreted
the Amerindian myths recounting the differentiation of humanity and
culture from a state of nature once shared on more or less equal terms
with animals as expressions of the natural mental processes of perception
and association through which he believed cultural forms are constructed.
On the other hand, he sought to understand how the sensuous forms
and properties of natural entities such as flowers or animal species are
unconsciously appropriated by the perceptual apparatus and related to
one another by cognitive psychological processes of association to form
cultural structures like classification and representation. Lévi-Strauss
has thus always conceived of the process of construction of basic cultural
structures as psychological and unconscious, rather than as an aspect of
intentional (conscious, subjective) social interaction, and conceived the
product of the process, the structures or structural variants themselves, as
abstract synchronic patterns rather than as including the transformational
operations through which they were produced. Cultural structures, in other
words, may be conceived as practico-inert transforms of a more inclusive
set of related structural “variants,” but not as themselves transformational
processes.
The synthesis at which he arrived, set out in The Savage Mind (in
French, La Pensée Sauvage, a pun meaning both “natural thought” and
“wild pansy”) was concisely evoked by the visual layout of the book’s cover,
which shows a picture of a wild pansy below the French title on the front
and a wolverine, celebrated in the text for its intelligence, on the back
cover. The book as an object thus constitutes a “sensuous gestalt” (the term
comes from Merleau-Ponty, to whom the book is dedicated), encoding
the message of the book that the human mind, in its natural state, is
constituted by the relation between the sensuous forms of the natural
world (the pansy) and the natural mental faculties of perception and
association (the wolverine). Culture and the ideational content of subjective
consciousness are represented by the pages of text encompassed by the
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two covers. Structural analysis as Lévi-Strauss conceived it thus became
a sort of ironic reductionism, or in his term an “entropology”, revealing
how human cultures in their very attempts to construct representations
of their differentiation from nature ironically succeed only in producing
constructs which reveal in their form and content culture’s true character
as an epiphenomenon of nature. The outcome of the structuralist analysis
of human cultural forms is therefore the reduction of humans and their
cultures to their true status as products of nature’s interaction with itself,
employing humans as the unwitting medium of the process.
For Lévi-Strauss, the important point was the natural quality of the
faculties and substantive contents of human mentation and culture, but in
emphasizing this he was also obliged to recognize the logical implication
that these natural sensory and cognitive faculties could not be conceived
as exclusively human, but must be understood as qualities of mind and
intelligence shared with other natural beings, which is why the wolverine
found its way onto the back cover of La Pensée Sauvage. In this way, LéviStrauss’s structuralism opened the possibility of a more radical theoretical
exploration of the sharing of mind or spirit by humans with animals and
other natural entities.
The major obstacle to this opening appeared to be the limitations
of the major constituents of structuralist theory itself, associationist
psychology, the approach to structure as synchronic pattern abstracted
from the transformational processes of its production, and above all the
strait-jacket of Saussurean semiotics, with its fixation on langue to the
exclusion of parole, signification to the exclusion of reference and meaning,
and abstract objectivity to the exclusion of subjective consciousness,
intention and agency. As these limitations became increasingly evident to
later generations of structuralistes receptive to new anthropological interests
in subjectivity, agency, and the integration of human culture in ecological
systems, the ascetic grandeur of Lévi-Strauss’s structuralist vision came
to be felt more and more as the product of an ironic limitation all its
own: the theoretical and methodological inadequacy of his use of his own
concept of structure. New ethnographic work carried out in the light of
new interests in cultural modes of subjective consciousness, constructions
of bodiliness, and interactions with the environment led to attempts to
formulate more holistic approaches to the relation of culture and society
with animals, plants and the natural environment. It must be emphasized,
at the same time, that much of this new work took inspiration from LéviStrauss’s ideas of the natural sources of mind and culture, following out the
implications of his suggestions that the structures and contents of mind
and intelligence are not specifically human possessions, but are shared
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with natural beings. Descola’s revision of animism, with its emphasis on
relations with plants as well as animals and other natural entities, was in
the forefront of this new cultural ecology.
Lévi-Strauss conceived the nature-culture relation ambiguously as both
external and internal: externally as a boundary between human culture and
the world of nature beyond the village; and internally as the psychological
divide between the mental processes of perception and association and the
consciousness of the cultural subject. Across this psychological frontier, the
former confront the latter as objective extensions of the external natural
world they mediate to the latter. The forms of this mediation, in LéviStrauss’s conception, are thus not only themselves continuations of the
objective natural environment but serve as the transcendental categories
of consciousness and subjectivity. Subjectivity and meaning, in this
perspective, become epiphenomena of the objective forms and processes of
nature. At the theoretical level, this may be taken to imply a reduction of
culture to nature. This, as we have seen, was Lévi-Strauss’s view, embodied
by the wolverine on the cover of la Pensée Sauvage—the exemplar of LéviStrauss’s conception of the naturalness of the mental processes that also
constitute the foundation of human culture and consciousness.
The wolverine itself, however, is not a cultural subject, for all its raw
intelligence. Lévi-Strauss’s naturalistic epistemological idealism implicitly
raises but does not answer the difficult question of the existence of subjectivity,
the product, if not the source, of natural intelligence and perception in
humans, in “natural” beings. If human culture and subjective consciousness
is asserted to rest upon a foundation of natural psychological processes and
gestalt-like patterns of sensory features of objects of perception, are we to
infer that the possession of such natural mental faculties and the ubiquity
of sensory gestalten in the natural objective world implies the existence of
superstructures of subjective consciousness, intentionality and even cultural
identity on the part of all beings thus endowed? A positive answer to this
question may take two main forms, one emphasizing the subjective aspect
of mind as self-identity, the other the objective, material consequences
of subjective identity for relations with other beings (especially humans).
Either way, the structuralist concept of the relation of nature and culture
as mutually external, contrastive domains becomes unsustainable. The
attempt to reformulate this fundamental relationship in the context of an
answer to the question of the nature of the mentality of natural beings has
thus become the focus of the crisis of Late Structuralism.
The first way of dealing with the question is to recognize that
if animals, plants, heavenly bodies and spirits are conceived to have
subjective consciousness, then the paradoxical indication, given the
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orthodox structuralist interpretation of the binary opposition between
nature and culture, in terms of which subjective consciousness is relegated
to the domain of culture, is that they may share the conscious identity of
human (cultural) subjects. The radical implication is that what orthodox
structuralists had considered the domain of nature is really a psychological
and epistemological colony of the domain of culture: natural beings
have, in short, become cultural beings, at least as far as they themselves
are concerned. This conclusion, reached by impeccable structuralist logic,
nevertheless clearly stands in contradiction to the orthodox structuralist
conception of the nature-culture relation as a privative opposition of
natural/objective and cultural/subjective domains. In so doing, it offers a
way (however bizarre) to move beyond it.
The second way of dealing with the same question proceeds from the
realization that if natural beings are conceived as possessing not only “wild”
intelligence and qualities of mind (i.e., la pensée sauvage) but subjective
identity that includes personhood and culture, so that humans might form
social relations with the natural beings with whom they share a common
mentality, subjectivity and spirit, the material and social boundary between
cultural and natural domains itself disappears, or at least becomes porous.
The resulting inclusion of animals, plants and other natural entities in the
human social and cultural domain now becomes, not merely an issue of
ideal categories or cultural classification, but also and equally of material,
social relations and activities. We thus arrive by a different route at another
contradiction of the orthodox structuralist conception of the nature—
culture relation as a privative opposition of objective nature to subjective
culture, which points to the possibility of a second way of answering the
question, and thus a different escape route from the Late Structuralist
impasse. This is the way that Descola calls the “domestication” of nature.
The former answer is the way followed by perspectivism; the latter is
the way followed by the revival of animism. These, in sum, are the paths out
of the impasse of Lévi-Straussian structuralism that have been followed
by his more restive intellectual followers: in the former case, Eduardo
Viveiros de Castro (from now on, EVC) and those he has inspired, and
in the latter by Philippe Descola and others who have shared his ideas.
In neither case do we see a complete break with structuralism. The
concern with the nature-culture relationship remains central to both, but
is transformed in different ways that involve consequential departures
from the received Lévi-Straussian canon. The framing of cultural analysis
in terms of the nature-culture relationship remains, but in each case the
meaning of its terms has been transformed in ways that open up new lines
of theoretical and ethnographic inquiry, while much of the Saussurean
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and formal structuralist theory responsible for the Late Structuralist
crisis is tacitly jettisoned. A critical understanding of the sources of the
crisis, however, provides a useful basis for understanding the common
features and differences of the new Animism and Perspectivism as the
two principal theoretical offspring of structuralism, and how it is that both
have converged upon the issues of body and “spirit”.
ANIMISM: NATURE AS UNIVERSAL PAN-SPIRITISM
The revival of anthropological interest in animism, Tylor’s conception
of the original form of religion, is primarily due to the work of Philippe
Descola. Tylor’s concept was based on the idea that natural objects and
beings, both animate and inanimate, possess spirits, conceived as consisting
of mental faculties, affects and subjective consciousness, although not
necessarily human-like personalities. Descola had noticed in his fieldwork
that the Achuar formed adoptive relations of kinship with natural
beings, including both plants and animals, considering them to have
subjectivity, intelligence, affect and communicative abilities. Although
humans participate in this pan-spiritism, spirit is not itself conceived as
an intrinsically human or cultural entity, but rather as an innate product of
natural powers possessed by all species, including humans, animals, plants
and spirits of the dead. Subjectivity and mentality as constituted by these
powers are rather believed to be universal natural attributes of all beings,
and although they may be amenable to social and cultural relationships
with humans, are not products of human culture. Rather, it is the possession
of these powers by natural entities independently of human culture that
makes possible communication with them by humans and the adoption of
some of them by humans as members of human society, thus constituting
them, in Descola’s terms, as elements of la nature domestique (Descola
1994). The universality of spirit does not imply universal homogeneity,
in the sense that all species of beings possess identical spirits, any more
than the universality of bodiliness implies that the bodies of all species are
the same. Rather, the heterogeneous bodily forms of different species of
beings correspond to distinctive spiritual forms, in many cases represented
by “master” spirit beings that embody the differential attributes of their
species-being. “Nature” thus comprises a world of objective differences of
bodily form associated with distinctive spirit forms, for which the generic
subjective faculties of spirit serve as a universal common denominator.
This is my interpretation of the ethnographic evidence, which differs
in one critical respect from Descola’s. Descola considers spirit to be an
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essentially human quality, so that the sharing of spirit by animals and
plants comes down to a sharing of humanity. In his interpretation, it is
this common humanity that makes possible the formation by humans of
kinship relations with animals and plants. This does not seem to me to
be a logically necessary conclusion, valid for all instances of animism in
Amazonia, but Descola offers ethnographic evidence for it from his own
Achuar research data and some other Amazonian societies.
It is clear in any case that animism, as Descola conceives it, has no
place for the nature-culture distinction conceived in structuralist fashion as
a privative opposition between the domains of human culture and nature.
Rather, Descola’s ethnographically based account of the interactions
of (Achuar) humans and non-human beings of various kinds, many of
whom enter into shared social relations, has the effect of transforming
the nature-culture relation from a binary opposition of logically distinct,
mutually exclusive categories presumed to correspond to discrete classes
of beings to a social relationship (or not) between discrete natural and
cultural beings, thus creating a shifting and permeable boundary between
the natural, non-social world and a social domain understood to include
both cultural humans and natural beings, where the latter are understood
to be endowed with human spirit identities. Culture, in its fully developed
form, thus remains conceived as a distinctive characteristic of human
society, but that society, in Descola’s heterodox formulation, does not form
a bounded cultural unit, since it may include relations with non-cultural,
although spiritually human natural beings. This still leaves unanswered the
questions of the source, form and content of this common spirit. These are
issues that may be clarified by a further consideration of the relations of
bodiliness, subjective identities and perspectives, which properly belong to
a critical discussion of perspectivism.
PERSPECTIVISM: NATURE AS
ANTHROPOCENTRIC PAN-CULTURALISM
Taking its inspiration at least as much from structuralism’s
critical dialogue with Modernist humanism as from anthropological
interpretations of Amazonian cultures, perspectivism has shaped itself
through a radical polemic against tenets of Modernist Western thought
from Descartes to Lévi-Strauss, as well as all received schools of cultural
anthropology. EVC presents perspectivist ideas as features of Amazonian
indigenous thought, but he develops his propositions not so much
through ethnographically based description and analysis of Amazonian
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cultures, as through a philosophical dialogue between ideal-typical
formulations of Western Modernist ideas and correspondingly general
representations of purportedly common Amazonian cultural ideas. This
rhetorical approach serves a methodological purpose and has theoretical
effects. The representation of Western Modernist ideas employed in the
cultural comparison as an integral, homogeneous system of highly abstract
ideal type-concepts rhetorically serves to authorize the perspectivist
representation of Amazonian ideas as an equally homogeneous system of
abstract concepts comparable in generality and corresponding in thematic
content and philosophical concerns with the Western system with which
they are compared: in short, a philosophical system not dissimilar from
Modern Western speculative idealism. The result is the misrepresentation
and mistranslation of the form, content and meaning of the ideal
categories and social meanings of many Amazonian cultural systems,
not to mention some of the Western ideas drawn upon for comparison.
There is furthermore a failure to recognize fundamental features of the
construction and meaning of specific categories and propositions that
differentiate the Amazonian categories in question from the Modernist
ideas with which they are compared. I agree with Lévi-Strauss, Viveiros
de Castro and other perspectivists that there are important common ideas
shared by many Amazonian systems (such as animism), but I also think
that there is equally good ethnographic evidence for significant differences
among the cultural constructions of different Amazonian societies, such
as those societies possessing large, effectively endogamous villages with
stratified systems of social groupings, like the Gê and Bororo, and those
with dispersed hamlets that are effectively exogamous and unstratified, like
many Tupian, Cariban, Shuar, Achuar and some smaller Arawakan groups,
with the Tukanoan and Arawakan societies of the northwest Amazon
appearing to combine features of both.
These conceptual and structural differences among Amazonian
societies, not to mention the differences among conflicting Western
Modernist philosophical and ideological positions, which receive equally
short shrift, have important implications for some of the theoretical points
at issue. This is not merely a matter of thematic content, but of the form
and construction of what are presented as corresponding or opposing
categories in these comparisons. The supposed Amazonian notions
presented as counterparts of the Modern Western notions of “nature” and
“culture”, and the related categories of “humanity”, “spirit”, “habitus” and
“form” are prime examples of this problem. I shall return to these points
in a moment. The existence of such significant variations within both
cultural systems points to the inadequacy of a purely idealist approach
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that is unable to account for them. This is not the place for a critique of
the representations of Modern Western thought that serve as contrastive
frames for perspectivist formulations of Amazonian concepts. For present
purposes it will be better to go directly to the ethnographic and theoretical
basis of perspectivist propositions about Amazonian ideas.
ANIMALS ARE HUMAN?
The most radical and distinctive perspectivist claim for the uniqueness
of Amazonian cosmologies and epistemological perspectives as contrasted
with Western ideas (including received structuralist anthropological ideas
about Amazonian cultures) is that Amazonians do not, after all, conceive
nature, as represented by animals, and culture as mutually distinct and
contrastive categories, in the manner of Lévi-Straussian structuralism.
Rather, animals, as the supposed embodiments of nature, subjectively
identify themselves as humans, and thus as cultural beings. Culture and
humanity are not limited to humanity, but extend to encompass nature
as well (at least animal nature: the extent to which plants and inanimate
entities, so prominent in Tylor’s concept of animism, are included in EVC’s
conception of cultural identity remains unclear). Subjectively speaking,
animals are really human, albeit with different outward forms, which
EVC dismisses as mere “envelopes” without significant connections to the
subjective identity of the essential being within. Similarly, the material
forms of activities are dissociated from their essential mental content from
the perspective of the animals that perform them. Animals thus supposedly
see themselves as engaging in the same cultural activities as humans even as
the objective forms of their activities appear to humans as animalistic and
uncultured. For example, jaguars, as they guzzle the blood of their victims,
conceive themselves to be sipping fermented manioc beer, a typical cultural
activity of some (though by no means all) human Amazonian societies.
EVC derives this challenging revision of received structuralist and
Modernist ideas from his reinterpretation of Amazonian myths and related
ideas from a number of Amazonian peoples. The myths in question relate
that before the development of human culture in its contemporary form,
humans and animals coexisted on relatively undifferentiated terms, sharing
language and, on the animals’ side, the prototypes of cultural implements
such as cooking fire, bows and arrows, dwelling houses, ways of hunting,
collecting and preparing food, and the spinning of cotton string. Animals
and humans could assume each other’s forms, converse, and even in some
cases marry. Each species nevertheless had its own characteristic bodily
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form, essentially that which it has today, and humans were marginally
cleverer than the animals (and meaner—they sometimes lied to the animals
or played tricks on them). According to EVC, the animals identified
themselves with humans and came to think of their behavior as cultural,
and continue to do so until the present day.
This last part of EVC’s interpretation, however, is not supported by
the actual texts of the variants of the myth with which I am familiar.2
According to these Gê and Bororo variants, ancestral humans did not yet
possess culture in the mythical era when they and the animals coexisted.
Rather, as I have mentioned, it was the animals rather than the ancestral
humans who initially possessed prototypes of key cultural products. The
humans had to steal or otherwise acquire these before they could learn to
produce them and thus create culture in the full, contemporary sense. The
human development of culture and the acts that led to it disrupted the
Edenic coexistence of the ancestral humans and animals, and resulted in
the loss by the animals of the proto-cultural possessions and skills they had
had. Animals thus became fully differentiated from humans as completely
natural beings, and humans correspondingly became fully differentiated
from them as contemporary cultural humans.
EVC’s interpretation of this myth (he seems to include the Gê and
Bororo myths, which Lévi-Strauss takes as the point of departure of
The Raw and the Cooked, among the “Amazonian myths” to which he
refers) provides much of the foundation for the theoretical edifice of
perspectivism. It proceeds from the assumption that the ancestral humans
of the myth, those who cohabited as equals with the animals, were identical
for all relevant purposes with contemporary humans: that is, that they were
already cultural beings. This assumption is essential to his thesis that the
animals of the mythical era, in identifying with their contemporaries, the
ancestral humans, thereby identified themselves as beings with culture in
the contemporary sense. EVC further interprets the myth as evidence that
contemporary Amerindians believe that the descendants of the animals
have continued to identity as human, cultural beings down to the present.
The main features of the mythical narrative (or at least the Gê and
Bororo variants), however, contradict these assumptions. In them, both the
humans and the animals of the mythical era are described as being more
like each other than is the case of contemporary humans and animals.
The myth tells how the contemporary forms of each became differentiated
through a process in which the ancestral humans transformed themselves
into modern humans through their invention of culture, while the ancestral
forms of the animals became less like humans, losing their proto-cultural
possessions, and thereby became totally natural beings like modern
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animals, completely lacking cultural traits. The perspectivist interpretation
of the myth, in short, gets it exactly wrong at least as far as this set of
myths is concerned. The whole point of these myths is not how animals
became and continue to be identified with humans, thus subverting the
contrast between nature and culture, but how animals and humans became
fully differentiated from each other, thus giving rise to the contemporary
differentiation of nature and culture. Rather than recount how the mythical
community of humans and animals resulted in a lasting identification
of the latter with the former, the myths tell the opposite story of how
the mutual differentiation of the species, and with it of their respective
subjective identities and perspectives, actually came about as a corollary
result of the one-sided possession of culture by humans.
The perspectivist interpretation not only misconstrues the overt
message of the Gê variants of the myth, but also rests upon other
inferences that find no support in the mythical narrative. These inferences
do not logically follow and appear to proceed from an unexamined
anthropocentrism. To begin with, the myth’s account of the original state
of relative undifferentiation between humans and animals does not include
any explicit assertion that the animals subjectively identified themselves
with humans. What the myths say is that animal and human identities,
and thus also, in perspectivist terms, their perspectives, were relatively
undifferentiated. Both possessed language and some other proto-cultural
traits, but they both also possessed animal traits, such as devouring their
meat raw. That the ancestral animals adopted some quasi-human traits no
more implies that they thereby identified with the proto-humans than
that the ancestral humans, by eating their meat raw, thereby identified
themselves as animals.
The implicit anthropocentrism of the perspectivist formulation
appears more starkly in other propositions of perspectivist theory, such as
those dealing with the “spirituality” of animals and participation in social
relations with humans. EVC assumes these aspects of animal character
and behavior must be the result of the animals’ identification with humans,
on the grounds that “spirit” and the capacity for social relations are
intrinsically human attributes. Neither Amerindian cultures in general,
Amazonian cultures in particular, nor the myths in question, however,
offer any support for this anthropocentric assumption. On the contrary,
indigenous Amazonian myths, cosmology and ritual practice provide
ample evidence for the opposite assumption, to wit that all entities, not
only animals but plants and even some inanimate objects, possess spirits in
their own right. It follows that they may have the capacity, if not necessarily
the propensity, to enter into social relations with humans, but this does not
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make them identify as humans. In this respect the ethnographic evidence
is consistent with a non-anthropocentric version of animism rather than
an anthropocentric perspectivism.
THE NATURE OF CULTURE
AND THE RELATION OF CULTURE TO NATURE
These critical reservations about perspectivism’s self-presentation as
a revolutionary transformation of orthodox structuralist and Modernist
conceptions of the nature-culture contrast and its claim to have identified
the basic principle of Amazonian cosmologies serve to bring into sharper
focus the continuities of perspectivism and structuralism in other
essential respects. Perspectivism actually retains the orthodox structuralist
conception of the relation of nature and culture as a privative binary
opposition of mutually exclusive classificatory categories defined through
the contrastive presence or absence of traits: thus culture is defined by the
possession of distinctive features like language, cooking fire, manioc beer,
etc., and nature, as the opposing category, is defined by the absence of these
features. Closer attention to the ethnographic detail of the myths on which
both structuralist and perspectivist notions of these categories are based,
however, reveals that this way of thinking misunderstands indigenous
conceptions of the nature of culture as well as the domain or condition of
nature, and most importantly the ubiquity and role of mediations between
the two such as those constituted by the prototypes of cultural items
possessed by the ancestral animals in the myths).
The myths do not represent the transition from the relatively
undifferentiated coexistence of humans and animals to fully developed
human culture and acultural animality as a simple process of the loss or
acquisition of traits. They emphasize the importance of the possession of
the proto-cultural possessions of the animals (the cooking fire, bow and
arrows, manioc beer etc.) as a crucial transitional stage between the two.
The essence of fully developed culture, as contrasted to the half-way house
of the animals’ prototypes, is rather described as the ability to produce these
things, and most importantly, what this ability further implies, the reflexive
ability to produce the process of producing them, as a generalized and infinitely
replicable form of activity.
What is involved here is not merely classification, or even a simple
cognitive or perceptual process of objectification, but a reflexive process
of meta-objectification, in an abstracted and generalized form: that is, of
the process of objectification itself. This clearly requires a different level of
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cognitive operations from that involved in the simple possession and use
of individual objects, even those that may constitute prototypes of cultural
artifacts. This is the difference, for example, between the one-piece cooking
fire possessed by the jaguars in the Gê myths of the origin of cooking fire,
and the use of a specimen piece of that fire to light other cooking fires at
the climactic end of the myth (Turner 1985:87-96). The ancestral animals
in the myths possess objects like cooking fire or beer or bows and arrows,
but these are represented only as singular possessions, as if they were, as
far as their animal owners are concerned, self-existing or self-objectifying
things, or found objects that the animals appropriated but never made.
The animals are nowhere described as having the cultural ability or power
to produce or copy such things. When humans acquire them from the
animals, by whatever means, the animals simply lose them. They cannot
make others to replace them, because they cannot produce production.
Culture comes fully into existence when the ancestral humans not
only come into possession of these objects but become able to objectify and
replicate the processes of objectification (in pragmatic terms, production)
by which they are produced: how to use fire to make fire, how to ferment
manioc to make manioc beer, or how to transform the surface forms of
their bodies with painting or ornaments to produce or regulate in culturally
standardized ways the internal bodily processes of transformation that give
rise to aspects of social personhood.
The products of such a process, whether material artifacts or conceptual
objects of knowledge, cannot be understood as simple, internally
homogeneous classes in a semiotic order of signification or ethnoscientific
taxonomy, but as complex schemas composed of heterogeneous elements
and levels of features, comprising transformational steps in a process of
mediating relatively natural to relatively cultural forms (for example, from
the appropriation of “natural” entities such as fire or game animals, to the
use of the fire to cook the flesh of the animals, and on to the use of the fire
to cook itself, that is, to make fire). The cooked meat, as a representative
cultural product, can be opposed in good structuralist fashion to raw meat as
an instance of the binary contrast of culture to nature, but what has made it
a cultural artifact is the transformative operations condensed within it, not
merely the cooking but the lighting of the cooking fire. Culture is thus not
opposed to nature as a simple, mutually exclusive binary contrast of semantic
features, but rather consists of a complex, reflexive, transformative relation
to it. This process both contains and overlies its basic natural components as
a series of incremental levels in a hierarchy of transformational operations
(schemas) of increasing generative (productive) power. Cultural things, in
other words, are compounds of natural content (the meat, the physical body
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of the social person) and the transformative activities through which it is
objectified (i.e. transformed into) cultural forms. Culture, understood in
these terms, neither excludes nor suppresses natural contents or qualities,
but rather retains and reproduces them through the employment of more
abstract and generalized meta-forms of the processes and powers that
produce them.
The emphasis of my discussion of the meaning of myths on the role
of the serial transformations of symbolic elements like the cooking fire
may recall the critique of Lévi-Strauss’s one-dimensional, synchronic
conception of the signification of the semiological elements of myth
offered in the introduction to this paper. An integral part of that critique
was the recognition that the “fundamental structures” of culture and the
mind that Lévi-Strauss hoped to reveal through the structural analysis of
“groups” of myths should properly be sought at the level of the invariant
principles governing the internal transformations comprising the structures
of individual myths or kinship systems. These transformations, of course,
are not limited to the individual symbolic or semiotic elements of cultural
constructs such as myths, but may involve more complex constructs such
as tropes (Turner 1991, 2006) or episodes of mythical narratives (Turner
1985). In the case at hand, I suggest that the progressive transformations
of the cooking fire as the central theme of the mythical allegory of the
emergence of culture from nature conform to the principle that the efficacy
of transformational activities (such as cooking) varies directly as the power
of those activities to produce (and thus transform) themselves. Production,
considered as a self-objectifying and self-transformative activity, is thus of
the essence of culture and its differentiation from nature.
This relatively sophisticated conception of the relation of nature and
culture as a transformational process rather than a synchronic, practico-inert
semiological contrast is clearly formulated in the Gê and Bororo myths, but
is rendered invisible by structuralist analysis like that of Lévi-Strauss in The
Raw and the Cooked, with its conceptual filter of Saussurean semiotics that
blocks recognition of the cultural significance of the activities by which
the objects and categories in question are produced. This is a fundamental
point of disagreement between the Amazonian myths, as interpreted
here, and perspectivism, given EVC’s assertion that production is not a
transformational process, leaving only exchange as a truly transformational
activity capable of inducing the transformation of perspectives. On this
critical point EVC shows himself an orthodox structuralist, following
Lévi-Strauss’s lead in The Elementary Structures of Kinship and other early
writings on kinship. In these writings Lévi-Strauss uses exchange theory,
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grounded in the “fundamental structure” of reciprocity, as the basis of
his analysis of kinship, begging the question of how to account for the
existence of the exchangers (the groups of men who supposedly gave rise
to human culture by exchanging women, not to mention the men and
women themselves). In sum: the transformations of productive activity,
which include exchange as one of their mediating moments, are, according
to the myths of at least one numerous and important group of indigenous
Amazonian peoples, the principle mediators of the relation of nature to
culture, and directly construct the pragmatic and conceptual structures
of culture itself. Perspectivism’s failure to theorize the role of productive
transformations in cultural structures is a major lacuna in its conception of
perspectives. It leads to its failure to recognize the reflexive operations of
objectification and meta-objectification which the myths represent as the
distinctive properties of culture for what they are: the most powerful and
important perspectives of all.
“MULTINATURALISM”: DIFFERENT WORLDS OR
DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES?
Perspectivism’s focus on Amazonian concepts of the self (for
perspectivism this essentially means the epistemological subject rather than
the agent of praxis) constitutes a salutary departure from structuralism’s
one-sidedly objectivist theoretical perspective, and its disinterest in the
role of subjective perspectives in the formation of cultural and semiotic
representations, including cosmologies. The one-sided subjectivism of
perspectivism would seem to qualify it as a form of relativism: if different
subjects see the world differently, it might be because they have different
subjective points of view, or different ways of seeing the world. EVC,
however, rejects this view of perspectivism as relativism, on the grounds
that Amazonians (and indeed, at several points in his argument, all
Amerindians) think that although animals, from their identical perspectives
as humans, see the world in the same way, they arrive at different ideas of it
because they see different worlds (this is what he calls “multinaturalism”).
To understand what is at issue here one must start by asking what the
differences are among the “worlds” that the animals supposedly see. The
answer given by EVC is: the animal identity of the different species of
animals, as seen by animal subjects of each species who identify themselves
to themselves as humans. Every species is seen by every other as an animal
but sees itself as a human (i.e., cultural) being. For every species, therefore,
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the boundary between nature and culture is differently drawn. Each species
thus sees a different “nature” than all the others. One may ask in what
way this differs from the conventional “naturalist” idea that each species of
animal recognizes its own kind and sees all other species as different kinds
of animal from itself. The answer is that the only difference appears to be
the assumption that each animal continues to identify itself as a human
and thus a citizen in good standing of the domain of culture, in contrast
to all the other animals. We may note in passing that this seems to leave
the form of the conceptual opposition of nature and culture intact as far
as its logical structure is concerned. Only its content is treated as variable
(“multiple”), and this only in virtue of the psychological principle of the
egocentricity of animal perspectives. The form of the worlds seen by all
species remains the same.
An additional problematic consequence of EVC’s idea of
multinaturalism is that having committed himself to the thesis that all
animals see themselves as humans, it becomes necessary for him to maintain
that the visible bodies of the different species (animals can of course see
their own bodies, or parts of them, as well as those of other animals) have
nothing to do with their inner subjective identities as humans. As he
writes:
Manifest bodily form of each species is an “envelope” (a “clothing”) that
conceals an internal humanoid form… this internal form is the soul or spirit
of the animal: an intentionality or subjectivity formally identical to human
consciousness. (Viveiros de Castro 2004:465)

Inner subjective identities, however, are invisible to other animals (and
humans). Animals of different species therefore must see one another
as animals rather than as they see themselves (with their minds’ eyes) as
humans. But on what basis do they “see” the animal natures of these other
species? The manifest form of the physical body has already been ruled
out as a mere “clothing” irrelevant to essential species identity. How then
to find a way of recognizing the significance of physical bodiliness to the
perspectival animal identities of other animal species? EVC deals with this
question as follows:
Animals perceive differences among species of animals not on the basis of
physiological differences—Amerindians recognize a basic uniformity of
bodies—but rather [of ] affects, in the old sense of dispositions or capacities
that render the body of each species unique… the body is in this sense an
assemblage of affects or ways of being that constitute a habitus… and the
body is the origin of perspectives. (Viveiros de Castro 2004:475)
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I don’t understand what EVC means by his claim that “Amerindians
recognize a basic uniformity of bodies” (not so in any relevant sense, in my
limited experience), nor what relevance the assertion that “animals do not
perceive physiological differences among species” is meant to have to his
claim about how “Amerindians” see the world (my italics). I do, however,
have some other questions about EVC’s use of the concept of habitus,
and its place in his complex argument for the relevance of bodily form to
subjective identity, spirit and perspective.
As a distinctive mode of affective orientation and behavioral disposition
toward the world, the habitus constitutes a pragmatic form of perspective
on it. In so many words, it constitutes part of an animal’s differential
perspective on the world, and thus the “different world” it sees. In sum, the
habitus must be the aspect of the body that is the “origin” of perspectives,
and as such conditions the specific “nature” seen by the species, quite apart
from its putative inner subjective identity as human, which is supposedly
unrelated to its bodily form, although in other connections that is the
aspect of animal being that EVC claims is the basis of its perspective
(indeed, the basis of “perspectivism” as a theory).
The concept of habitus is critical for EVC because it does not purport
to point inward to the subjective identity of the animal, but outward to
its behavior and interaction with the world. EVC defines the concept as
affective rather than cognitive (in contrast to other theorists like Mauss or
Bourdieu who employed the concept to denote both cognitive and affective
modes of subjective perspective), and as composed of the specifically bestial
behaviors of the species. It thus, by virtue of this idiosyncratic definition,
becomes identified as the “natural” aspect of species identity, in contrast to
the cognitive, cultural human aspect comprising its inner subjectivity. In
effect, the reformulation of the concept of habitus becomes the indispensable
basis for the reimportation of the structuralist opposition of nature and
culture as the frame of EVC’s concept of animal identity, in a way that
leaves the cultural (spiritual, human) component intact and insulated from
the bestial, natural bodily aspect of the creature. The fundamental principle
at issue here is the mutual dissociation and irrelevance of external bodily
(natural, affective) form and internal spiritual (cultural, cognitive) content.
It is no doubt in order to highlight the distinctive role of habitus in this
respect that EVC asserts that “Amerindians recognize a basic uniformity
of bodies”, which if taken literally would mean that they do not perceive
or cognitively “recognize” bodily differences among animals, which if
true would indeed seem to leave affective habitus as the animals’ only
visibly differentiable property. Apart from the question of what evidence
could possibly be found for such an assertion, the attempt to restrict the
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meaning of habitus to affective dispositions seems untenable, and as soon
as a cognitive dimension is admitted, the use of the concept in EVC’s
argument becomes contradictory. As a specific mode of material activity,
the habitus of a species must obviously take into account the physical
shape, size and capacities of the species’ physical bodily form. It must thus
constitute the framework, not only of an integral subjective (affective, but
also cognitive) perspective on the world for the animal in question, but also
of the objective identity of each species as it is perceived by other species.
It therefore appears to stand in contradiction of the putative conceptual
“uniformity” of their bodies, as well as the dissociation of bodily features
and appearance as mere “clothing” from aspects of the character (affective
disposition, typical modes of behavior, etc.) if not the inner spiritual
identity of the species.
MULTINATURALISM AS “TYPE” AND “BOMB”
“Multinaturalism”, as I have suggested above, rests squarely upon
the foundation of the familiar structuralist contrast between a general,
and at the most abstract level, unitary, category of culture and an equally
generic, abstractly unitary category of nature. Both categories can be, and
routinely are, employed at less abstract and general levels to apply to the
varieties of specific cultures and natural species, respectively giving rise to
multiculturalism and multinaturalism. These are simply analogous moves
within a taxonomic hierarchy consisting of different levels of generality
and more or less ample provision for differing subjective perspectives, not
whole opposing philosophies, as EVC argues. In the same way, “naturalism”
and “multinaturalism”, which EVC represents as contradictory theoretical
perspectives, the former being that of outmoded, pre-perspectivist
Modernism and the latter the perspectivist view that is now supplanting it,
are more accurately if simply understood as tags for foci on different levels
of the same conceptual hierarchy. “Naturalism” does not imply a denial
of differences among species any more than “multinaturalism” entails
a rejection of common natural (biological) animal properties shared to
varying degrees by all of them. It differs from “multinaturalism” in taking
seriously the positive relationships between bodily features, habitus and
the inner character and perspectives of natural creatures, but in this I
believe it is closer to the thinking of most if not all Amazonian Indians
than perspectivist “multinaturalism”.
“Multinaturalism” in any case does not logically supplant the natureculture distinction shared by most varieties of Modernism, including
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structuralism and anthropology, which EVC collectively terms “naturalism”,
as he claims. Rather, multinaturalism continues to presuppose it as the
common form of the contrast between the habituses of all the different
animal species and the human (cultural) identity that constitutes their
“formal subjectivity”. For EVC, as I have described in the preceding section,
the psychic and bodily structure of each species constitutes a logically
identical microcosm of the privative contrast between spiritual, human,
cultural identity and a bodily, bestial, affective, natural perspective. Thus
the binary nature-culture opposition that had supposedly been shattered
and transcended by the concept of multinaturalism returns as the formal
framework of a potentially infinite number of cases, like the many little
brooms that arise from the shattered broomstick in Disney’s film of “The
Sorcerer’s Apprentice” in “Fantasia”.
This metaphorical interpretation of the implications of multinaturalism
for the human and natural sciences may be contrasted with EVC’s claim
(as reported by Bruno Latour in his deliriously enthusiastic account of
the public “disputatio” between EVC and Descola held in Paris in January
2009) that perspectivism and multinaturalism constitute:
[A] bomb with the potential to explode the whole implicit philosophy
so dominant in most ethnographers’ interpretation of their material…
[Multinaturalism is] a much more troublesome concept [than perspectivism]…
Whereas hard and soft scientists alike agree on the notion that there is only
one nature but many cultures, Viveiros wants to push Amazonian thought…
to try to see what the whole world would look like if all its inhabitants had
the same culture but many different natures. (Latour 2009:2; cf. Descola and
Viveiros de Castro 2009)

This, according to Latour, is the essence of EVC’s conception of “the
Amerindian struggle against Western philosophy”, spearheaded by the
concepts of perspectivism and multinaturalism, which he accuses Descola
of trying to reduce to “just another curio in the vast cabinet of curiosities
that he [Descola] is seeking to build” (Latour 2009:2).
“‘Pushing’ Amazonian thought” into propositions patently alien to it
(Amazonian peoples are keenly aware of, and interested in, the differences
among their own cultures, let alone those of the non-indigenous peoples
with whom they have come into contact, and would be the first to find the
idea of a mono-cultural world absurd) may be a fascinating speculative
exercise for non-indigenous intellectuals, but it has left anthropology far
behind to take a place all its own as a “curio in the vast cabinet of curiosities”
of perspectivist philosophy.
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THE BODY AS THE “ORIGIN OF PERSPECTIVES”:
BUT WHAT BODY (-IES)?
These difficulties at least have the merit of focusing attention on the
centrality of the idea of the body as the “origin of perspectives”. This idea of
the relation of bodiliness and perspectives actually contains several issues
of critical importance to the anthropology of Amazonian cultures.
The first is that of precisely what is meant by “the body”: the physical
body to be sure, but there is also a social body, which is something else
again. The physical body itself is a complex entity that is not at all moments
of its existence an individual entity. It originates as a union between two
physical bodies of opposite sexes, is born as cultureless being more animal
than human, acquires cultural personhood, then dies and is transformed
into a spirit which becomes an animal-like being again who terrifies his
or her surviving relatives by seeking to kill them so that they could join
him or her in the spirit world (this at any rate is the Kayapo idea). The
body, in short, even as a physical entity, is not an abstract object with a
fixed, culturally human perspective, but a process comprising a series of
transformations, each of which entails a transformation of perspectives,
not all of which are cultural: in the Kayapo view, at least, we start and finish
as animals.
As noted, however, there is also a social body. This is a polymorphous,
androgynous entity, defined as a conjunction of relations among all the
relevant social types of bodily identities constructed of contrastive values
on shared dimensions like gender and social age, which formulate the
signification of each bodily type through their contrastive relations to the
other types that form part of the same system (e.g., bachelor youth, married
woman, elder man and/or woman). The relationally defined identities of
social bodiliness define perspectival relations of each embodied person to
other bodily identities that form part of the same system. It is this system
of contrastive values as a whole, comprising every socially marked stage of
bodily development of both genders, from before birth to after death, that
constitutes the external relational form of the social body (Turner 1995).
There is also, however, an internal composition of the social body, made
up of the bodily senses, powers and processes that together comprise the
socially relevant content of the externally related gendered and generational
categories of bodily form. In some Amazonian societies, different senses,
for example, are considered not only as of varying importance but also as
the channels of different modes of knowledge. As Santos Granero has
noted, the Kayapo associate hearing (/-mari/) with knowing, but it is a
specific kind of knowing, passive understanding as contrasted with the
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active knowledge of how to do things, which is more associated with sight
(/-omun/) (cf. Santos Granero 2006:72; Turner 1980, 1995). Vocalization
(speech and singing), though not a sensory faculty, is associated with the
system of senses and modes of knowledge, since speech is the channel of the
knowledge that must be internalized through the auditory channel. Smell
is not much emphasized by the Kayapo, but as Santos Granero reports it
is a culturally emphasized source of knowledge among the Yanesha, who
however consider hearing the most important sense, followed by seeing,
with smell in third place; C. Crocker reports that among the Bororo smell
is the faculty through which the presence of a class of spirits, the Bope,
and the presence of the dead and the giant water spirits who take part in
mortuary and initiation rites are perceived (Santos Granero 2006:72,73,77;
Crocker 1985). The point for present purposes is that for the Kayapo
and many other Amazonian peoples, these differentiated sensory modes
of knowledge are also integrally identified with distinct categories and
aspects of social identity that are culturally marked by specific forms of
bodily adornment (ear plugs, lip plugs, body painting in different age- and
gender-related styles, etc.) (Turner 1980, 1995). The same can be said for
stages of physical growth, the development of sexuality and reproductive
powers, and for a man, whether or not he has acquired power by killing an
enemy.
Taken together, all of these internal bodily powers, sensory forms
of knowledge, and stages of growth, culturally marked by modifications
of the surface of the body, collectively constitute a template or filter for
the channeling, regulation and selective suppression of internal bodily
powers, energies, sensory capacities and modes of knowledge as well as the
contents of the external relational categories, identities and perspectives
that I have called the social body (Turner 1980, 1995). It is this system
of external and internal articulations of the social body, as articulated by
the culturally stylized decoration of the form of the body’s surface (skin,
coiffure, items of costume and adornment) that in indigenous Amazonian
societies shapes and defines the social meaning of the physical body to
its social and natural environment. It is this complex entity, comprised of
the physiological body as mediated by the social body, then, that is “the
origin of perspectives”. Rather than identify this point of origin with the
physical body in opposition to the social identity and cultural subjectivity
of the person, which seems to be EVC’s point, in sum, I would argue
the contrary, which is that the synthetic social and physical body is the
origin of perspectives precisely because it is the formal (culturally defined)
subjective identity of the person.
A second major issue has already been mentioned in passing, which is the
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mutable nature of perspectives considered as moments of transformational
social and natural processes (as distinct from their abstract ideal character
as attributes of semiotic or cultural classification). EVC appears to conceive
of perspectives as fixed aspects of species identities, which are essentially
like synchronic signifieds in Saussurean fields of signification abstracted
from discourse, social uses and processes. For perspectivism, the class as
an ideal identity thus becomes the subject position that functions as the
real “origin of perspectives” (as I have pointed out above, this does seem
awkward for EVC’s contention that animals’ subjective identity as humans
is unconnected with their bodies, which are supposedly the origin of all
perspectives). There is thus for perspectivists only one, fixed perspective per
species-class, or even per super-class of species (e.g., all species of animals,
who collectively have the identities and thus the perspectives of humans, if
only on themselves). Against this I would argue that perspectives, rooted
as they are in the synthetic social and physical body, are for that reason
also integrally connected with the social relations of that body to other
social and physical (cultural and natural) bodies. These compound entities
and relations go through developmental processes and therefore undergo
regular transformations at several levels. For individuals, there are the
developmental transformations of social age and status that comprise the
life cycle. These are in turn bound up with the transformations of family
relations and role-identities that constitute the developmental cycles of the
family and domestic group, which produce sui generis transformations of
subjective perspectives of the members of these social units.
These transformations remain within the generic class of human social
relations and perspectives as contrasted to natural (animal, plant, etc.) ones.
One can thus speak of hierarchies of perspectives, comprising the overall
common perspective of members of the class as they go through successive
transformations of their species- or class-identities. I have referred to
collectively standardized transformations such as those that constitute the
normative patterns of the life cycle or family cycle, but as Rosengren and
also Pedersen have emphasized, there are idiosyncratic individual identities
and perspectives that also go through transformations below the level of
any collective social pattern. These may coexist with collective institutional
patterns as I have described or they may not, as in the cases discussed by
Rosengren (Pedersen 2007; Rosengren 2009).
Some transformations may produce changes in the generic human or
animal subjective or spirit-identities of an individual. For the Kayapo, as
I have noted above, the human life cycle does not end with death, but
continues through a transformative period of separation of the spirit from
the decomposing body, after which the disembodied spirit loses its human
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identity and becomes “transformed into an animal” in the metaphorical
language of Kayapo keening for the dead. At this point, therefore, the
basic species identity itself and the human perspective that goes with it
are lost and the ghostly spirit assumes the perspective and identity of an
animal. It should be emphasized that such perspectival inversions and
transformations are not the result of “predation” or the “cannibal cogito” as
adduced by perspectivist theory to account for ambiguous instances of the
juxtaposition of contradictory aspects or elements, as Wright has pointed
out in an analogous context (Wright 2009:151-152).
FORM AND CONTENT, BODY AND “SOCIAL SKIN”,
SCHEMA AND SPIRIT
The third major issue associated with bodiliness is the complex matter
of the relation of external bodily form to inner subjective identity, a common
concern of Amazonian cosmologies and concepts of subjectivity alike. It
can be argued (and has been so argued by EVC) that for many Amazonian
peoples, the physiological body is considered a mere “envelope” of the spirit
or subjective consciousness: external physical form, in so many words, does
not determine inner subjective content. In speaking of bodily form and its
relation to subjective identity, spirit or perspective, however, it is essential
to distinguish between the form of the physical body as a property of the
species and the meta-form of the social body constructed by adornment
and modifications such as coiffure, painting and clothing that together
constitute what I have called a “social skin” (Turner 1980).
As a general ethnographic point, the universal practice of Amazonian
cultures in altering the external form of the body through changes in
adornment, painting, coiffure, dress and scarification, to mark and help
to bring about transformations in the social identity and subjective
perspective of persons, is inconsistent with assertions that the Amerindian
peoples of Amazonia regard bodily form as modified by this “social skin”
merely as an external “envelope” unrelated to the inner material and
spiritual content of subjective identity and/or personhood. The critical
point is that the deliberate adornment of the surface of the body is for
Amazonians a means of defining and regulating the identity and social
relations of the person. The importance of this practice arises from the idea
that subjectivity or spirit is to an important degree the product of a person’s
social relations. More precisely, it is the product of an interaction between
the inner powers and senses of the body, and the modes of knowledge
and capacities for growth and activity they make possible, and the external
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world of social relations and activities. The natural form of the unadorned
body is a tabula rasa across which the interchange between the internal
content of bodily powers and senses and the external social world that is
mediated by the meta-surface of the “social skin” takes place. In this sense
the physical body considered as surface form could be called an “envelope”
that does not determine the inner character of the spirit or subject, while
cultural forms of bodily decoration take over the role of imposing definite
perspectival form on both the inner subjective identity and external objects
of interaction of the embodied person.
ANIMISM AS UNIVERSAL NATURAL
SPIRITUAL PERSPECTIVE
Many if not all Amazonian cosmological systems are founded on the
principle that the forms of things immanently contain the agency or power
to produce themselves, through the transformation of their own contents.
The forms of things, in other words, are actually embodied processes of
formation, or the potential capacity and templates for them. They contain
the agency or force that impels the content of things to assume the specific
characteristics and behavioral patterns proper to their species or kind.
This proposition holds, in principle, for the cosmos as a whole and all its
constituent units, including humans and their social groupings, animals
and plants, spirits of the dead and non-living beings such as celestial
bodies like the sun and moon. In practice, it applies primarily to humans
and higher animals, birds and fish, but it also holds in principle for the
forms of lower animals, plants and major celestial bodies. It is intuitively
most directly applicable to beings which undergo developmental processes,
and thus most obviously partake of the dynamic quality of formation.
The forms of things, in this view, are the guiding patterns of purposive
activity that cause their objective physical contents to take on the form
in question. They embody in this sense the spiritual force or subjective
agency of the entity, that which makes it what it is. In the case of animate
beings, their objective forms are thus conceived to be the products or
manifestations of a subjective power of intentional action. An example of
this is the Kayapo term /karon/ which is used equally to mean “image”,
“form”, “shadow” or the “spirit”, soul, or ghost of a person or other entity.
Although humans are thought of as the spirit- (/karon/) possessing beings
par excellence, mammals, birds, fish and many trees, vines and other plants
are also thought to possess spirit-forms and associated subjective powers.
Here we rejoin the basic notion behind the “animism” common to most
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if not all indigenous peoples of the Amazon (Bird-David 1999; Descola
1996, 2005). Animism, in other words, is grounded in the idea that spirit
is essentially the guiding principle, animating force, and intentional goal
of the bodily process by which it is produced. The synthesis of form (or
spirit) and content (or body) that constitutes a natural entity—a living
being or inanimate natural entity like the cosmos or celestial bodies, in
this view, can only be created and maintained by the exercise of the agency
or power immanent in the form in question. The spirit of the entity is
the form considered as an image or pattern that needs material content
to exist. It is this need which becomes the force holding the form and
content of the entity together. This unity is variable in strength, unstable,
and susceptible to disruption and eventual dissolution as the subject loses
its energy and power. Such dissolution can be either temporary, as in
illness or shock induced by extreme fright, or permanent, as in the death
of the person or organism. The spiritual force or formative aspect of the
entity may thus under extreme conditions become separated from the
bodily or material content of its form, but neither spirit nor body can exist
independently for long without the other. Death brings the permanent
separation of spirit-form from body-content, and thus dissolves the
synthesis of form and content that is the basis of the objective existence of
the organism. The fission of the synthetic unity of spirit and body results
in the further decomposition and ultimate disappearance of its separated
parts. The /karon/ or spirit-form continues to live on after the death of
the body as a ghost, but gradually loses its human character, becoming an
animal-like being in the forest and eventually dissolving completely. The
material content (/in/, flesh or body) undergoes a parallel transformational
process from living body to mass of dead (/tuk/, “black”, “dead”, or “in
transformation”) rotting flesh, finishing as a disarticulated jumble of white
bones.
BODILINESS, SPIRIT AND THE
HUMAN DIMENSION OF ANIMISM
The Kayapo think of their own bodies as hybrid combinations of
natural animal qualities of form and content, supplemented by acquired
formal attributes of social identity. The former are exemplified by internal
physical processes located primarily in the central trunk of the body, such
as growth, digestion, sexuality and reproduction. These natural energies
and powers become transformed and directed into socially patterned
activities of various kinds that are associated with transformations of
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bodily form, including the natural processes of growth, aging, and puberty,
and the cultural modifications of the surface of the body such as painting,
hair-styling, and the wearing of ornaments. These modifications of surface
form serve as a two-way filter that gives specific social meaning to relations
between the embodied person and external entities with whom he/she
interacts.
“Nature”, in other words, is an integral component of human social
bodies and thus of social persons. Natural forces and aspects of being
(things that exist of themselves independently of human social activity)
thus constitute essential components of central sites of social space-time
and “culture”, as well as the peripheral natural zones of forest and savanna.
The structure of human society, in sum, like human beings as individual
embodied persons, incorporates fundamental “natural” forms of spacetime, agency, and powers, including those inherent in the animal content
of human bodiliness and reproductivity. Human beings, moreover, undergo
transformations to and from animal forms of being and identity in the
course of their life and death cycles: fetuses in the womb and newborn
babies are thought of as animal-like beings with special affinities and
vulnerabilities to influences from animals and ghosts. The latter are likewise
considered to lose their identities as humans and to end their existence
as animal forms (they are addressed as having transformed themselves
into animals in mortuary chanting and keening). Human culture is thus
conceived more as an incremental transformation of these natural elements,
a “super-nature”, as it were, than a qualitatively distinct order of existence
contrasted to “nature” in a mutually exclusive binary contrast with an
excluded middle. The essence of this cultural increment is the application
of natural transformational processes (such as fire) to themselves (as in the
use of fire to make fire), thus generalizing and replicating what in nature
remain relatively isolated processes.
As beings with specific forms and spirit-identities shared with the
other members of their species, humans and animals are similarly occupied
with the form-giving, spirit-directed processes of growing, aging and dying,
producing and reproducing, objectifying and de-objectifying themselves.
The generic forms and contents of these processes consist of functional
activities (i.e., hunting, foraging, eating, drinking, finding shelter, mating
and reproducing) which are essentially identical for all embodied spiritbeings regardless of the particular differences in their forms and contents.
Beings of different species can thus identify their concretely different
activities on the basis of their functional equivalence from the perspective
of their common engagement in sustaining their bodies and spirit-forms.
Plants also engage in analogous processes, but in many Amazonian cases
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they are not conceived to do so as individual organisms but rather as
instances of collective entities, which embody the spirit of their species.
An anteater lunching on an ant hill and a human lunching on a
sandwich can thus regard themselves as engaged in the same functional
activity, lunching. The human might express this sense of equivalence
metaphorically by saying that the anteater is eating his sandwich, and the
anteater might express the same perception by thinking of the human as
licking up his ants. In terms of their shared perspective as form-guided,
content-sustaining entities, there is no basis for privileging the human’s
over the anteater’s way of expressing the functional identity of their
activities.
In a similar vein, the Kayapo think of other species as having their own
forms of such human artifacts or activities as houses, songs and ceremonies,
and even for some purposes (such as shamanic communication) language,
although they clearly recognize that the actual forms taken by these
activities are very different from their human equivalents. The belief in a
generic identity of spirit, and the consequent equivalence of functionally
identical activities, does not imply that either humans or animals make
no distinctions between the specific differences between the forms of
animal and human spirits or activities, or that they imagine that animals
identify themselves as humans “under the skin”. It does mean, however,
that all living beings, and some non-living ones, are engaged in processes
of forming, sustaining and eventually losing their synthetic unities of
form and content. The intentional orientation, forms of consciousness
and energetic force that drives these processes constitute what we, and the
indigenous peoples of Amazonia, call their spirits.
CONCLUSIONS
Structuralism as a theoretical and ethnographic quest has passed
through successive stages of construction, expansion and dissolution. Like
its subject matter, the myths, kinship systems, bodies and persons of the
indigenous societies of the Amazon and more broadly the Americas, it
can be seen to have developed through a series of transformations, each
affording distinct perspectives, but all constrained to remain within the
invariant limitations of its own theoretical shortcomings. Chief among
these was its failure to grasp the proper application of its eponymous
concept, structure, to its own research data, and thus to realize its potential
as an anthropological project. Its failures, however, have been instructive.
Like a giant star that has burned up its internal sources of energy, in
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its terminal implosion it has been sending out dazzling flares rich with
material for new planetary systems. These new systems, the dissident
successor movements it has inspired, above all perspectivism and the new
work on animism, have raised new issues of importance to the field and
stimulated fresh discussion, of which the present paper is but one of many
examples.
At the beginning of the paper, I suggested that the basic problem of
structuralism was that it started with the right idea but applied it to the
wrong level of the data. My critiques of perspectivism and to a lesser extent
animism have in several cases taken the form of suggestions of how the
original structuralist notion of structure (the group of transformations
constrained by invariant principles of conservation) could be applied
to the data in question in a way that would strengthen the theoretical
formulations of perspectivism and/or animism. In the case of the body
and its avatar, the subject, for example, I argued that the perspectivist
notion of the body as the origin of perspectives, where both the body and
its associated perspective are conceived as singular, unchanging entities,
should be substituted by a conception of both bodies and perspectives
understood as sequences of multiple transformations (thus potentially
constituting groups of transformations bounded by one or more principles
of conservation as called for in the structuralist model). I further suggested,
as a qualification of different aspects of both perspectivist and animist
ideas, that the perspectives and bodily conditions in question transform
themselves from “natural” (the condition of embryos and infants) to
“cultural” and ultimately back to “natural” with the onset of the dissolution
of human form in aging, death and post-mortem ghostly existence.
Extending my dialogue with animism, I urged that conceiving the body in
appropriate structuralist terms as such a series of transformations opens a
perspective on bodiliness as a process of interaction of the physical body,
social body and person, stimulated and guided by relations with other
embodied actors filtered and regulated by formal treatments of their bodily
surfaces (“social skins”). This process of producing subjective perspective
and objectified bodily form, drawing upon the natural bodily content of
senses and powers, goes through a series of stages but it ultimately enters a
terminal stage of deobjectification as the natural content of bodily powers
weakens to the point where it cannot sustain its integration within the
frame of personal identity and social form. The dissolution of form and
content continues through the physical dissolution of death and the
separate disintegration of spirit and body.
For the Kayapo and other indigenous Amazonian peoples with
whom I am somewhat familiar, this dialectical process of production and
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dissolution, objectification and deobjectification, the embodiment and
ultimate disembodiment of subjective intention and identity, manifested
and articulated through the integration and disintegration of form and
content, is the essence of the material and spiritual existence of the
animate and inanimate beings that constitute their life world. It is in
no way unique to cultural humans but is, rather, common to all natural
entities. It can be understood as a broadly “animist” perspective, but gives
no justification for the anthropocentric bias of some animist discussions of
“spirit” as an essentially human attribute. This is also an important point for
perspectivism: the mere possession of a spirit or subjectivity does not in and
of itself indicate that an animal or plant therefore identifies itself as human
(as it would if spirit and subjectivity were intrinsically human qualities). It
is true that some, though certainly not all Amazonian cultures consider at
least some animals to identify themselves subjectively as humans in some
respects, but this should not be understood as following necessarily from
their possession of their own spirits. There are many cases of beliefs that
animals and plants (or their collective species-spirits, the “masters” of the
game or plant species, etc.) possess spirits that owe nothing to human
contacts or culture.
I have argued that closer attention to the detailed structure of
indigenous conceptions, both of natural beings and human embodied
persons, is essential to avoid the distortions inherent in attempts to treat
all Amazonian (or even all Amerindian) cultures as a single, homogeneous
philosophical system. Dismissing the importance of divergent or even
contradictory formulations of the same points on the part of societies
of different types precludes the most useful anthropological method for
understanding the social and cultural basis for such agreements as do exist.
The critique of structuralist, animist and perspectivist theories I
have offered in this paper has served as the context for reformulating the
concept of structure as a series or group of transformations internal to
the developmental process of entities, ranging from individual symbols or
tropes to bodies and spiritual identities. I have attempted to show that
this way of conceiving structure can serve to integrate Marxian concepts
of productive praxis as well as interpretationist and semiotic approaches
with the valuable contributions of Lévi-Straussian structuralism and its
more recent epigones. Most importantly, I have sought to suggest how the
hybrid, post-post-structuralist theoretical amalgam I have outlined may
contribute to understanding some of the features of Amazonian cultures
that have been brought to light through the ethnographic and theoretical
work so powerfully stimulated by the debates of Late Structuralism.
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NOTES
Acknowledgements. Many of the ideas in this paper were presented in lectures
at the Federal University of Paraná in Curitiba, Brazil (“Humanidade, forma e
objetivação na consciência social Kayapó”, presented to the Programa de PósGraduação em Antropologia Social, October 17, 2007), and the University
of Copenhagen, Denmark (“Perspective on perspectivism”, delivered to the
Department of Anthropology on November 13, 2008). I benefited greatly from the
discussion of these lectures by students and colleagues. I am particularly indebted
to Dr. Morton Pedersen of the Department of Anthropology of the University
of Copenhagen for his comments after my lecture in Copenhagen, his writings
on Mongol perspectivism and in a seminar he presented to the Department of
Anthropology at Cornell University several months before. Robin Wright has
made many valuable comments and provided me with numerous references during
the writing of this paper. Laura Rival provided pertinent critical comments and
bibliographic references. Hanne Veber and Sören Hvalkov contributed valuable
personal ethnographic data on the Asheninka.
1. For a fuller discussion of the limitations of structuralism, including its
failure to produce viable structural analyses consistent with Lévi-Strauss’s own
definition of structure, becoming in effect itself a form of post-structuralism avant
l’heure, see Turner 1990 “Structure and Entropy: Theoretical pastiche and the
contradictions of ‘structuralism’.” Current Anthropology 31(5):563-568.
2. See, for example, the following myths reproduced in J. Wilbert, Ed., Folk
literature of the Gê Indians (1978), listed by number and page: 57(160), 58(164),
59(166), 62(177), 63(181), 64(184), 65(190), 66(191), 90(242), 93(247), 94(248),
96(251), 99(257), 104(263), 105(265), 106(266), 107(266), 108(268) 109(269),
111(274), 112(276), 113(279), 114(285).
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